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Insider Threats in Banking Sector: Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation

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ABSTRACT

The banking sector, being a custodian of sensitive financial data, has increasingly become a prime target of insider threats. Unlike external cyberattacks, insider threats originate from within the organization, making detection, prevention, and mitigation more complex. This study provides a comprehensive review of scholarly and industry literature from 2015 to 2024, focusing on insider threats in financial institutions. The article categorizes insider attacks into four key vectors—data exfiltration, misuse of privileged access, social engineering, and cloud exploitation. It examines modern detection mechanisms such as user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA), anomaly detection, and deception technologies, alongside preventive frameworks including Zero Trust Architecture, multi-factor authentication (MFA), and employee awareness training. Mitigation strategies like continuous monitoring, blockchain-based audit trails, and incident response automation are also discussed. The findings highlight that while technical solutions have matured, human-centric and behavioral models remain underutilized. The study concludes with a call for integrating technical tools and human factors through predictive analytics and cross-disciplinary collaboration to effectively manage insider threats in banking.

Keywords: Insider Threats, Cybersecurity, Data Protection, Threat Detection, Risk Management, Mitigation Strategies, Banking Sector, Behavioral Analytics, Zero Trust.

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1. Introduction

Insider threats are becoming increasingly critical in the banking sector due to the growing reliance on digital systems and remote operations. These threats originate from individuals within the organization—such as employees, contractors, or trusted third parties—who have legitimate access to systems and data, making them especially difficult to detect, prevent, and mitigate [1], [2], [14]. The financial industry remains a top target due to the high-value data it processes and stores daily. Recent high-profile incidents, such as the Tesla and Capital One breaches, illustrate how insider actions—whether malicious or accidental—can lead to significant reputational and financial damage [18], [45]. Additionally, the shift toward remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic has further complicated insider threat detection, expanding the attack surface and reducing the effectiveness of traditional perimeter-based security approaches [46], [47]. Despite advancements in cybersecurity tools, many organizations continue to underestimate the human element in cyber risk, often focusing on external threats while neglecting the vulnerabilities posed by insiders [37], [38], [49].

2. Methodology

This study employs a literature review and document analysis approach, focusing on peer-reviewed research articles, cybersecurity white papers, and industry frameworks published between 2015 and 2024. The objective is to synthesize existing knowledge on the challenges, benefits, and practical strategies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating insider threats in the banking sector.



Figure 1: Graphical Abstract of Insider Threats in Banking Sector

The literature review is guided by a systematic process that includes keyword-driven searches across academic databases such as IEEE Xplore, ScienceDirect, and SpringerLink. Keywords include “insider threat,” “banking cybersecurity,” “data leakage,” “user behavior analytics,” and “zero trust architecture.”

The inclusion criteria focus on empirical studies and authoritative guidelines specifically targeting insider risks in financial institutions. The analysis places emphasis on comparative evaluation of methodologies, risk frameworks, and effectiveness metrics [25], [28], [29]. Industry-recognized documents such as the NIST Insider Threat Guidelines and CERT’s Insider Threat Program Evaluation are also considered to provide structured benchmarking [30], [35]. Additionally, this study adopts thematic coding to extract patterns related to attack vectors, human behavior, and control mechanisms, following qualitative analysis principles used in previous insider threat research [36].

3. Result and Discussion

This review divides the results into four key dimensions:

3.1 Attack Vectors

Insider threats in banking typically manifest through four main attack vectors: data exfiltration, misuse of privileged access, social engineering, and cloud service exploitation.

- Data Exfiltration is the most prevalent technique, accounting for approximately 35% of insider incidents, often involving the unauthorized transfer of sensitive financial data via USB drives, email, or shadow IT channels [8], [14].
- Misuse of Privileged Access represents around 30% of cases and occurs when system administrators or high-level users abuse elevated permissions [16], [22].
- Social Engineering contributes to 25% of insider threats, exploiting human weaknesses through phishing, baiting, or pretexting [12], [35].
- Cloud Exploitation is a rising vector, responsible for 10% of attacks, often due to shared credentials or misconfigured cloud environments [7], [40].



Figure 2: Attack Vectors

3.2 Detection Mechanisms

Modern detection systems in banking institutions increasingly rely on AI and behavioral analytics, replacing traditional rule-based monitoring.

- User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) tools analyze activity across systems to establish behavioral baselines and flag anomalies. Financial institutions using UEBA reported a 30–40% improvement in identifying suspicious insider behavior compared to traditional systems [21], [23].
- AI-driven anomaly detection systems have reduced average insider threat detection time by up to 40%, offering quicker response capabilities against evolving threats [22], [38].
- Deception technologies, such as honeypots and decoy files, are increasingly deployed to lure and detect malicious insiders. Studies suggest their usage results in a 35% reduction in breach severity by catching malicious activity earlier in the attack cycle [13], [44].

- Integration of SIEM platforms with UEBA improves threat visibility and contextual understanding, allowing for real-time correlation of behavioral anomalies and alerts across systems [24], [41].

However, these detection systems still struggle with false positive rates exceeding 20%, which can overwhelm security teams and lead to alert fatigue if not managed properly [36], [39].



Figure 3: Detection Mechanisms

3.3 Prevention Strategies

Effective prevention of insider threats requires both technical enforcement and human-centric controls.

- Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) eliminates implicit trust by continuously validating users and enforcing micro-segmentation. According to industry reports, ZTA adoption reduces successful insider breaches by up to 30% in financial organizations [26], [30].
- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) remains a foundational defense against compromised credentials. Banks implementing MFA across all endpoints observed a 20%–25% decline in unauthorized access incidents [28], [46].
- RBAC and ABAC frameworks enforce least-privilege principles. Studies show these controls lower the risk of insider privilege misuse by up to 35%, especially when dynamically updated with user behavior analytics [27], [48].
- Employee awareness and training programs, particularly around phishing and data handling, have demonstrated a 25% reduction in insider incidents when deployed quarterly with simulated phishing tests and compliance check-ins [29], [42].

Despite these strategies, prevention success heavily depends on continuous enforcement, cultural alignment, and leadership support.



Figure 4: Preventive Strategies

3.4 Mitigation Techniques

Mitigating insider threats requires rapid response, comprehensive visibility, and auditability.

- Continuous monitoring and real-time alerting enable early identification and containment of malicious insider actions. Organizations employing always-on monitoring saw a 40% improvement in incident response time [31].
- Automated incident response playbooks, integrated into SIEM or SOAR platforms, reduce manual response delays by up to 50%, helping analysts triage and remediate threats more effectively [32].
- Blockchain-based audit trails are increasingly used to provide tamper-proof logs of user actions and system changes. These records have improved forensic accuracy by 20–30%, supporting regulatory audits and internal investigations [33].
- Adopting standardized frameworks such as NIST SP 800-53 and CISA Insider Threat Guidance helps improve coordination across teams and ensures legal and operational alignment [34], [16].

However, many institutions still struggle to integrate these mitigation strategies with legacy infrastructure, leading to delays in threat response and forensic readiness.



Figure 5: Mitigation Techniques

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, this review highlights the persistent and evolving nature of insider threats in the banking sector. Through a comprehensive analysis of 49 scholarly articles, industry white papers, and regulatory frameworks, this study underscores the multifaceted dimensions of detecting, preventing, and mitigating insider threats.

The key findings from this review are summarized as follows:

1. Insider attack vectors predominantly include data exfiltration, misuse of privileged access, social engineering, and exploitation of cloud environments. Notably, insider-related breaches account for approximately 35% of all financial institution security incidents [8], [14], [47].
2. Detection mechanisms have advanced through the integration of AI-driven analytics, UEBA, and SIEM tools. These technologies have reduced threat detection time by up to 40% compared to traditional rule-based systems [21], [22], [38], though they remain prone to false positives exceeding 20% [36], [39].
3. Prevention strategies, including Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), MFA, and RBAC/ABAC frameworks, have proven effective in reducing access-related threats. Employee training and awareness programs have been shown to reduce incident likelihood by up to 25% when implemented continuously [26], [28], [29], [42].
4. Mitigation techniques such as real-time monitoring, automated incident response, and blockchain-based audit trails offer increased agility in responding to insider threats. Adoption of frameworks like NIST SP 800-53 and CISA's insider threat guidance has improved institutional readiness and regulatory alignment [16], [31], [32], [33].

Despite these advancements, several challenges remain. These include the high cost and complexity of integrating AI solutions, limited adoption of deception technologies, and a lack of standardized approaches to incorporating human behavioral insights into threat models [20], [36], [43]. Future research should focus on developing predictive frameworks that combine technical indicators with psychosocial profiling, enhancing early detection and targeted intervention. Additionally, there is a need for scalable, cloud-native security architectures to address emerging insider risks in hybrid work environments. Ultimately, an effective insider threat program in banking requires a multi-layered approach, blending technical solutions, organizational culture, and regulatory compliance.

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Ethics declarations
This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.

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Competing interests
All authors declare no competing interests.

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